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The Ambiguity of Serrano:Two Concepts of
Wealth Neutrality
By LEE S.

FRIEDMAN*

Introduction
In a four to three decision on December 30, 1976, the California
Supreme Court affirmed a trial court finding I and held that the system of
public school finance in California was invalid because it violated the state
constitution's guarantee of equal protection of the laws. 2 In the court's
opinion, the fundamental defect was that the finance system "makes the
quality of a child's education depend upon the resources of his school
district . . . . ",3 In this commentary, any system free from this defect will
be termed "wealth neutral." ' 4 The court has not provided a clear test to
distinguish wealth neutral systems from offending systems. Since the meaning of "full" compliance is thus uncertain, the current legislative debate
about "full" and "substantial" compliance is vacuous. The nature of this
ambiguity will at some point compel further court guidance. The purpose of
©

Lee S. Friedman
A.B., 1968, Dartmouth College; M.A., Ph.D., 1973, Yale University. Assistant Professor of Public Policy, University of California, Berkeley. Professor Friedman notes: My
thinking on this subject was first stimulated by the student members of the California School
Finance Task Force of the Graduate School of Public Policy which I directed during 1975-76.
The contributions of Thomas Barletta, Steve Hinze, Barry Murphy, and Hans Van Winkle
warrant special mention. All the members surely deserve some credit for any good ideas that
may be contained herein; since they have not seen this work, I must take sole responsibility for
any shortcomings. Allan Sindler and Stephen Sugarman have tried to keep the latter to a
minimum by providing helpful comments and criticism.
1. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976),
cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3822 (U.S. June 15, 1977).
2. Id. at 774-75, 557 P.2d at 957, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
3. Id. at 755, 557 P.2d at 944, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 360 (quoting Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I),
5 Cal. 3d 584, 614, 487 P.2d 1241, 1263, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 623 (1971)).
4. Economists use the word "fiscal" in reference to tax and expenditure policies, and
"neutral" to mean not affecting resource allocation decisions. Serrano II held that wealth was
not to affect resource allocation in education; hence "wealth neutrality." It is fiscal policy
which should be non-neutral; such a policy is intended to affect resource allocation decisions in
education to offset the influence of wealth.
*

[4871

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 4

this commentary is to delineate the nature of the ambiguity and to examine
alternative paths to its resolution.
In Part I, two different concepts of wealth neutrality and the tests that
can be used to distinguish offending from neutral systems under each are
described. This section continues by describing the inconsistency between
these two concepts; that is, why it is generally impossible to satisfy both
simultaneously. Part I concludes with a discussion of which concept is
preferable. After a review of the Serrano rulings, 5 Part II suggests that the
courts were unaware that these concepts are in fact inconsistent. Three
additional matters involving the meaning of wealth neutrality which Serrano
II left unresolved are also discussed in this section: taxpayer equity requirements, 6 the $100 rule of the trial court, 7 and the constitutionality of
basic aid. 8 Finally, in Part III, the two bills pending in the legislature (A.B.
65 and S.B. 525) 9 are analyzed to determine whether either one is likely to
meet one of the two tests for wealth neutrality.

I.

Defining Wealth Neutrality

A. The Basic Ambiguity: Ex Ante or Ex Post Wealth Neutrality?
How can one distinguish a wealth-related disparity 10 from any ordinary
disparity? That question is posed "tongue in cheek" because it is of course
possible that disparities may be offensive for reasons other than wealth.
Nevertheless, the Serrano decision only requires the elimination of wealth5. Serrano 11, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976); Serrano 1, 5 Cal. 3d
584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); Memorandum Opinion Re Intended Decision,
Serrano v. Priest, Super. Ct. of the County of Los Angeles, No. 938,254 (Apr. 10, 1974);
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Serrano v. Priest, Super. Ct. of the County of Los
Angeles, No. 938,254 (Aug. 30, 1974).
6. Serrano II, 18 Cal. 3d at 757 n.35, 759 n.38, 557 P.2d at 945 n.35, 946-47 n.38, 135 Cal.
Rptr. at 361 n.35, 362 n.38.
7. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 57, Serrano v. Priest, Super. Ct. of the
County of Los Angeles, No. 938,254 (Aug. 30, 1974); Serrano II, 18 Cal. 3d at 749 n.21,557 P.2d
at 940 n.21, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 356 n.21.
8. Basic state aid consists of a flat grant to each district of $125 per pupil per year,
regardless of the relative wealth of the district. See CAL. CONST., art. IX, § 6, para. 4; CAL.
EDUC. CODE §§ 177501, 17801 (West Supp. 1977) (current version at id., §§ 41370, 84360, 41800
(West Spec. Pamph. 1976)). Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 57, 62, Serrano v.
Priest, Super. Ct. of the County of Los Angeles, No. 938,254 (Aug. 30, 1974).
9. A.B. 65, Cal. Legis., 1977-78 Reg. Sess. (1977-78 Regular Session) (Dec. 15, 1976)
(introduced by Assemblyman Greene); S.B. 525, Cal. Legis., 1977-78 Reg. Sess. (Mar. 10, 1977)
(introduced by Senators Rodda and Dills).
10. By disparity, I mean differences among districts in educational expenditures per
ADA, unless otherwise noted. ADA (Average Daily Attendance) is computed by adding
together the number of students actually present on each school day and dividing that total by
the number of days school was taught. Serrano 1, 5 Cal. 3d at 592 n.4, 487 P.2d at 1246 n.4, 96
Cal. Rptr. at 606 n.4.

Summer 1977]

WEALTH NEUTRALITY

related disparities."' The trial court's task in this regard was made easy by
the existence of patent disparities between high-wealth and low-wealth
school districts, the former spending, in 1973-74, from two to four times
more per pupil than the latter. 12 But suppose that under a new system the
number of low-wealth districts spending more than high-wealth districts
increases, and that in those cases where low-wealth districts spend less, the
absolute differences diminish. Could the boundary between a neutral and an
offending system then be defined?
One approach to this problem is statistical. The first determination is
whether differences in district educational expenditures per child are systematically (statistically) and significantly related to differences in district
wealth per child. The mathematical procedures for conducting such a test
are relatively straightforward.1 3 This may be called expost wealth neutrality
because it is a test conducted after expenditure choices are made. 14 The
i1. In fact, the trial court holding specifically allows disparities based upon the special
educational needs of students and differing costs that districts face in providing identical
educational services. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 56, Serrano v. Priest, Super.
Ct. of the County of Los Angeles, No. 938,254 (Aug. 30, 1974). Whether disparities based on
the different preferences of voters in different districts are offensive is another issue.
12. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 18, 19-20, Serrano v. Priest, Super. Ct. of
the County of Los Angeles, No. 938,254 (Aug. 30, 1974).
13. Briefly, the procedure is to run a multiple regression analysis where the dependent
variables are district expenditure per ADA with all categorical funding and cost adjustments
removed, and the independent variables are district wealth per ADA, the square of this term,
and the cube of the term. The latter two terms are included so that the regression represents a
Taylor series expansion, which can identify both linear and non-linear relationships. The
expansion beyond simple linear regression is necessary to identify, for example, a financing
system where both low- and high-wealth districts have high educational expenditures but
average-wealth districts have low expenditures. Violations of wealth neutrality are indicated by
regression coefficients which are different from zero (with high statistical confidence, as
judged by a t-test). The larger the absolute value of the slope of this equation, the greater is the
degree of violation. While the statistical procedures may be unambiguous, the decision on how
different the coefficients may be from zero without constitutional offense remains with the
court.
A simpler, but more restrictive, empirical test is for the court to require that a very large
percentage of all districts (e.g., 95%) have expenditures (net of categoricals and cost adjustments) within a fixed range (e.g., $1200-$1400). See A. Rodda, Basic Elements of School
Finance Proposal for Reasonable Compliance with Serrano 2-3 (Feb. 17, 1977) (memorandum).
The reason this test is more restrictive is that its practical effect is to deny equal-wealth districts
the option of a wide choice of expenditure levels. Since the test, as given, only applies to
expenditures other than categoricals to meet special needs or district cost differences, it
restricts voters from providing substantially different amounts of additional funds for the
children attending school in their district. By contrast, the first test only restricts voter
preferences to the extent they are wealth-related. Further, the second test may not be sufficient
because expenditures may be wealth-related within a fixed range.
It should be mentioned that the difficulties noted by the trial court in statistical procedures
designed to separate the effects of factors influencing achievement test scores do not occur
with force here. Memorandum Opinion Re Intended Decision at 89, Serrano v. Priest, Super.
Ct. of the County of Los Angeles, No. 938, 254 (Apr. 10, 1974). The only question being asked
is whether expenditures are related to wealth. What measure of wealth to use is a question
deserving of debate but one which arises independently of any statistical testing.
14. Stephen M. Barro briefly notes the distinction between ex ante and expost neutrality
in a very interesting article. S. Barro, Alternative Post-SerranoSystems and Their Expenditure
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important characteristic of the ex post test is that it judges a financing
system by its results. If for any reason high-wealth districts have a statistically verified tendency to spend more than low-wealth districts, or vice
versa, the ex post test will not be satisfied, i.e., the condition of wealth

neutrality is violated.
A second approach, ex ante wealth neutrality, requires the financing
system to ensure that equal tax efforts result in equal expenditures. 15 In its
simplest version, district power equalizing, the tax effort is measured by the
property tax rate. 16 Under this system, the state publishes a schedule relating
expenditure levels to property tax rates. The only way a district can have a
particular expenditure level is for it to tax itself at the rate corresponding to
that level on the state schedule. A district chooses its tax rate, and receives
the expenditure level associated with that rate. If the locally raised revenues
are not sufficient to provide the necessary expenditures, the state subsidizes
the difference. If more than enough revenues are raised, the district must
turn the excess over to the state. Districts making the same efforts, i.e.,
choosing the same tax rate, have the same expenditures.
There are good reasons for rejecting the property tax rate as a fair
measure of tax effort, however. 17 Consider two districts with equal property
wealth but whose residents have different income levels. The same property
tax rate choice would seem to imply a greater effort by the district with
lower income residents. Even though measures can be constructed to account for this condition, 18 the property tax burden is a difficult and controImplications, in

SCHOOL FINANCE IN TRANSITION: THE COURTS AND EDUCATIONAL REFORM, 25,

32 (J. Pincus ed. 1974).
15. An alternative, more general ex ante definition requires only that the financing rules
omit district wealth in the official formula or formulae determining district expenditures per
child. Despite the appeal of its simplicity, this approach has undesirable features as a standard
of wealth neutrality. All systems satisfying the definition in the text also satisfy this more
general definition; thus the latter includes "inequitable" systems which the former precludes.
(The latter would be "inequitable" because it would violate the peculiar tax equity notion of the
ex ante standard, as defined in the text. As a matter of pure tax equity, it is generally considered
more equitable to provide funds to low-wealth districts out of general funds rather than taxes on
specific government services provided by wealthier districts). Such an approach would not
necessarily be inappropriate as a constitutional standard whose only purpose is to guarantee
protection of the child's fundamental interest in education from the influence of wealth.
Nevertheless, it will be argued that the ex ante standard as proposed in the text does not ensure
this protection. A fortiori, neither does the more general definition. Since the general definition
is not only plagued with the deficiencies inherent in any ex ante standard but also has been
considered by the courts, it merits no further discussion.
16. District power equalizing was first proposed in J. COONS, W. CLUNE, & S. SUGARMAN.
PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 201 (1970).
17. The task force I directed filed a brief of amicus curiae in the recent Serrano II
proceedings to ensure that this viewpoint was represented. See note 59 infra.

18. See, e.g., 1 SENATE
65-67 (Calif. 1972).

SELECT COMMITTEE ON SCHOOL DISTRICT FINANCE FINAL REPORT
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versial issue. 19 In a district with many renters and absentee landlords, a high
property tax rate might be a large burden if it is shifted to tenants through
rent increases, though only a small burden if paid by the absentee landlord
through a lowering of property value. Thus, it is not easy to determine what
constitutes equal effort, because the decision as to whether known burdens
among people of unequal wealth are equal entails a value judgment, and
because it is difficult to know what all the burdens are for each individual
taxpayer.
In sum, the ex post wealth neutrality test is essentially concerned with
the results of any school financing plan, e.g., that actual expenditures not be
systematically related to the wealth of districts. An examination of the rules
would only be required if necessary to change the results, not as a test of
constitutionality. On the other hand, the ex ante wealth neutrality test is
inherently concerned with the rules of any school financing plan, e.g., that
equal tax efforts lead to equal expenditures. The resulting pattern of expenditures does not matter so long as the rules are fair.
B. The Inconsistent Relationship Between the Ex Ante and Ex Post Standards
It is generally impossible to satisfy both types of neutrality simultaneously. There are of course exceptions. The legislature can ensure the
achievement of both ex ante and expost neutrality by redistricting or by full
state funding.
Suppose the legislature redesigned the boundaries of school districts so
that all districts had the same wealth. No disparities of either type would be
caused by differences in wealth since such differences would not exist.
Nevertheless, this is not an attractive alternative under a design with numerous districts, because the relative wealth per pupil may change rapidly over
time due to changes in school population and total district wealth. Although
reducing the number of districts would decrease the frequency with which
redistricting would be required, it would also increase the administrative
problems of ensuring intra-district equality and might destroy the sense of
community many associate with small neighborhood districts.
The second method of ensuring both types of neutrality is full state
funding. Under this method, the state sets a uniform expenditure level for all
schools. This ensures ex post wealth neutrality as there are no expenditure
differences. The state then raises the necessary revenues through a particular
statewide tax (e.g., income, sales, or property) that burdens all equally.
Since all residents make equal tax efforts, by legislative definition, the
system is ex ante wealth neutral. Nothing in this system precludes the
legislature from providing categorical funds to take account of special
19. See Aaron, A New View of Property Tax Incidence, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 212 (1974).
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student needs and the differential costs that districts face in providing the
same services (e.g., a classroom at reasonable temperature), or from establishing a fund for innovative demonstration projects as long as all schools or
districts have equal opportunity to apply. Furthermore, local community
control over the use of funds can be maintained. Of the two methods that
satisfy both tests for wealth neutrality, full state funding seems preferable.
Neither system allows local choice of expenditure level among districts
of varying wealth. In any system where districts have unequal wealth and
such local choice is permitted, however, it is generally impossible to satisfy
simultaneously both types of wealth neutrality. To illustrate why this is so,
consider the pedagogic example of one person choosing how much of a
particular good to buy. This will depend, of course, on the individual's
wealth, the price of the good relative to other goods, and the preferences that
the person has for the goods in question. For example, compare the purchase
of fast food hamburgers with the purchase of yachts. It may be that one or
two hamburgers per week is all that a person can tolerate, such that doubling
wealth results in no increase in hamburger purchases. It may be that the
person actually buys fewer hamburgers. In both cases, the proportion of
wealth spent on the good decreases as wealth increases. In a more typical
case, there may be a small increase in the quantity purchased, but total
spending on the good would still decrease as a proportion of wealth. The
proportion of wealth spent on yachts, by contrast, may increase as wealth
increases.
Clearly, there is no reason to expect all people to spend the same
proportion of their wealth on any particular good, even if they had identical
preferences. If district power equalizing is deemed to offer all people the
opportunity to buy a given quantity of education for the same fraction of
their wealth, there is no reason to assume a priori that low-wealth groups
will choose the same proportions and, therefore, quantity, as high-wealth
groups. Thus, it would be a fortuitous empirical result if education happened
to be precisely that kind of good for which low-wealth groups chose to make
their "efforts" equal to high-wealth groups.
For the sake of exposition, the discussion regarding behavioral response to district power equalizing is oversimplified because it covers only
income or wealth effects. In the hamburger and yacht examples, the price of
each was assumed constant. Yet district power equalizing ensures that lowwealth districts pay a lower price per unit for education than high-wealth
districts. The price effect alone would tend to increase purchases in the lowwealth districts. 20 Empirical studies of spending on public education sug20. This price difference is, in fact, where the "power" in district power equalizing lies.
The only way in which DPE changes district wealth from the status quo is that a low-wealth
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2
gest, however, that as a commodity it is more like hamburgers than yachts. '
The price effect of district power equalizing thus works to magnify this
result: if people had identical preferences, low-wealth districts would
choose higher expenditure levels than high-wealth districts. In practice,
preferences may differ. If preferences are education-intense in high-wealth
districts, this would mitigate the result described. Some economists have
tried to estimate how school districts would respond to district power
equalizing, but the statistical problem is thorny and the results are mixed.
While three of the best studies all agree that such plans will not result in ex
post wealth neutrality, two estimate that district power equalizing will
reverse the spending disparities, i.e., low-wealth districts will spend more
than high-wealth districts because the price per unit of education is so much
cheaper for them, and another concludes that high-wealth districts will
continue to spend more than low-wealth districts because the former's
residents have strong preferences for education.2 2 In any case, there is only a
remote chance that district power equalizing will satisfy the ex post
neutrality test.
One question remains: could the definition of "equal effort" be manipulated in such a way that ex post results are achieved? Imagine designing a
system which is considered to follow the "equal effort, equal expenditure"
rule. Suppose the results are such that high-wealth districts continue to
spend substantially more than low-wealth districts. Then draw the inference
that the initial design was faulty: low-wealth districts still carry a greater
burden in attempting to reach a given expenditure level. Redesign the
"effort" measure to reduce the difficulty of raising revenue in low-wealth
districts. Continue this process until the results are ex post wealth neutral
and simply define the efforts leading to these results as equal. While such an
exercise can be conducted, it is farcical because it effectively dispenses with
the ex ante test. It might be argued that the exercise is not a charade because
community can purchase the same quantity of education as it previously did and have some
extra dollars left over, because the price is lower, to spend on anything they wish (hamburgers,

yachts, or education).
Horizontal equity requires, certainly, that equally wealthy districts are charged the same
price, and district power equalizing meets this test. The adjustments in price necessary to

achieve ex post wealth neutrality also must be done by treating equally wealthy districts alike.
See Feldstein, Wealth Neutrality and Local Choice in PublicEducation, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 75

(1975) [hereinafter cited as Feldstein].
21. See generally W. GRUBB & S. MICHELSON, STATES AND SCHOOLS: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE (1974) [hereinafter cited as STATES AND SCHOOLS];

Feldstein, supra note 20. The study suggesting undercorrection is D. Stem, The Effects of
Alternative State Aid Formulas On the Distribution of Public School Expenditures in Mas-

sachusetts (1972) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation in the M.I.T. library).
22. See generally STATES
at 13.

AND SCHOOLS,

supra note 21; see also Feldstein, supra note 20,
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"true" tax equity should lead to ex post neutral results; that is fallacious
because if the identical system were to be applied to the provision of any
other good (e.g., police services), the results would undoubtedly not be ex
post wealth neutral. 23 It seems insensible to insist that the same burden is
fair for one good but not another.
In sum, it is possible to marry the two independent concepts of ex ante
and ex post wealth neutrality only by a redistricting plan or by full state
funding. Any financing system that allows local choice of expenditures in
districts of varying wealth requires a separation of the concepts. Either
concept can be achieved in this context, but not both.
C. The Choice Between the Standards
The ex post standard seems preferable as the real test of constitutionality, but the ex ante standard may be useful as a temporary guide to the
drafting of legislation. If local choice without redistricting is desired, an
initial plan with "equal effort, equal expenditure" rules would at least
provide information on expenditure choices during the phasing-in process.
The final tax rates could be adjusted to achieve ex post neutral results. The
ex post standard is preferable because it protects the interest of children in
education; the ex ante standard purports to protect the interest of taxpayers
in sharing fair burdens. While both interests are important, if only one can
be mandated as a specific constitutional principle, the educational interest of
children seems more, important. In other words, the legislature may weigh
the alternatives of local control, taxpayer equity, redistricting, and increased
state funding, provided the interests of school children are protected in the
final solution.
The ex post standard requires that the average expenditure per child in
low-wealth districts be equal to the average expenditure per child in highwealth districts, apart from all categoricals, special needs, or cost adjustments. 24 This standard does not restrict variation in spending among districts
of the same wealth, but such variation could only arise as a result of varying
preferences among voters in different but equally wealthy districts and not
due to variation in pupil needs or costs, which must be analyzed separately.
Whether a child's education should vary according to the non-wealth-related
23. Recall the first example with hamburgers and yachts. To induce individuals of differing wealth to spend the same proportion of their resources on hamburgers, the wealthier

individual would have to be offered a lower price than the poorer individual. In the case of
yachts, however, the price for the poorer individual would have to be lowered. The adjustments

go in the opposite direction and equity has nothing to do with it. This is an extreme example, but
it is generally true that the precise "equal effort" definition necessary to make the consumption
of one good wealth neutral will not lead to neutrality if applied to another good.
24. This statement is a slightly simplified version of the formal requirement for ex post
wealth neutrality described earlier. See notes 13-14 and accompanying text supra.
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whims of voters is a constitutional question distinct from that raised in
Serrano, which only concerned wealth-related disparities. The ex ante
standard, on the other hand, only requires that equal tax efforts lead to equal
expenditures. This possibly protects the taxpayer; it guarantees nothing to
children. As the examples in this section demonstrate, under such rules it is
not voter preferences but wealth itself that causes differences in expenditures. Moreover, substantial ex post wealth-related disparities could still
occur. While it is possible that ex ante standards could lead to ex post
neutral results, that is no reason to reject the ex post standard. Ex post
wealth neutrality is still the preferable test of constitutionality.
II.

The Serrano Decision

A. The Failure to Recognize Inconsistency
The Serrano opinions leave the impression that the court would like to
have both ex ante and ex post wealth neutrality. In the 1971 Serrano I
ruling, the court wrote that "wide differentials remain in the revenue
available to individual districts and, consequently, in the level of educational expenditures. . . . Thus, the state grants are inadequate to offset the
inequalities inherent in a financing system based on widely varying local tax
bases.' " 25 This seems to suggest that the court is concerned with resulting
expenditure disparities. The court may correctly believe that it is the unequal
tax bases which cause disparity, but the differences in tax bases would
presumably not be of concern if expost disparities did not result. Similarly,
the court later stated: "The foundation program partially alleviates the great
disparities in local sources of revenue, but the system as a whole generates
school revenue in proportion to the wealth of the individual district. "26
Again, the concern for results was evidenced by the court's analogy to the
poll tax: "In Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, . . . the high court
struck down a $1.50 poll tax, not because its purpose was to deter indigents
from voting, but because its result might be such. 27
The court raised the ex ante question only once in 1971. The court
noted: "[T]he parents allege that . . . as a direct result of the financing
system they are required to pay taxes at a higher rate than taxpayers in many
other districts in order to secure for their children the same or lesser
educational opportunities.' '28 The court simply noted, however, that because the second cause of action (that of the parents) incorporated the first
cause of action (that of the children), and a constitutional defect was found
in the first cause of action, plaintiff parents had demonstrated a sufficient
25.
26.
27.
28.

Serrano 1, 5 Cal. 3d
Id. at 598, 487 P.2d
Id. at 602, 487 P.2d
Id. at 618, 487 P.2d

at
at
at
at

594, 487 P.2d at 1247-48, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 607-08.
1250-51, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 610-11.
1254, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 614 (emphasis in original).
1265, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 625.
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cause of action. 2 9 The supreme court then remanded the case to the trial
court, so that it could determine the truth or falsity of the facts alleged in the
plaintiffs' complaint."
In finding for plaintiffs, the trial court was bolder in its ruling. On the
ex ante issue, the trial court concluded:
The California public school financing system fails to meet the
equal protection requirements of the California Constitution because property taxpayers who are plaintiffs in this action, as a
direct result of the California public school financing system, are
required to pay taxes at higher tax rates than taxpayers in many
other school districts of the State in order to obtain for their
children the same or lesser educational opportunities
than are af31
forded to children in such other school districts.
Still more bluntly, the trial court concluded: "The equal protection provisions of the California Constitution require that school districts receive the
same revenue for the same tax rate." ' 32 In its findings of fact, the court also
cited several financing plans that did not produce wealth-related spending
33
disparities, including district power equalizing.
The trial court did not, however, settle on the ex ante definition and
reject the ex post alternative. Actual disparites in spending were also of
great concern:
The wide disparities in expenditure levels between low-wealth
school districts and high-wealth school districts, which will be
continued for years under S.B. 90 and A.B. 1267, are unconstitutional because they have significant adverse effects on the quality
of the educational programs and opportunities afforded the children in the low-wealth school districts as compared with the quality
of educational programs and opportunities afforded the children in
the high-wealth school districts.
The per pupil expenditure differentials between school districts
under the school financing system, including S.B. 90 and A.B.
1267, constitute a denial of equality of treatment
to the children of
34
the low-wealth school districts of the state.
The trial court felt comfortable in requiring both that expenditure disparities
be eliminated and that equal tax rates lead to equal expenditures, because of
an empirical assumption: "To the extent that equal tax rates can produce
different expenditure levels, or that equal expenditure levels can be produced by different tax rates, even when convergence has been completed,
29. Id. at 618, 487 P.2d at 1266, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 626.
30. Id. at 619, 487 P.2d at 1266, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 626. Since the court was ruling on
demurrers, it considered all of the allegations of plaintiffs' complaint as true.
31. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 47-48, 57,58, 63, Serrano v. Priest, Super.
Ct. of the County of Los Angeles, No. 938,254 (Aug. 30, 1974).
32. Id. at 59.
33. Id. at 31-32.
34. Id. at 64-65.
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the system will still be generating school revenue in proportion to the wealth
of the individual district." 35 In other words, the court assumed that "equal
effort, equal expenditure" rules would lead to expenditures which did not
correlate with the wealth of the district. Unfortunately, as an empirical
36
proposition, this assertion is almost certain to be false.
The trial court decision was appealed to the California Supreme Court,
which affirmed the judgment of the lower court in Serranoff. As in Serrano
I, the court seemed more concerned with actual disparities, but did not
reject any trial court findings or conclusions related to the "equal effort"
requirement. For example, the supreme court summarized the trial court
findings as follows: "Substantial disparities in expenditures per pupil
among school districts cause and perpetuate substantial disparities in the
quality and extent of availability of educational opportunites. For this reason
the school financing system before the court fails to provide equality of
treatment to all the pupils in the state." 37 The court thus viewed expenditure
disparities as causing disparities in'educational opportunity; thus, educational opportunity cannot be construed to mean "a decent tax base." Assuming
the court meant school offerings, a later footnote in the Serrano II opinion
becomes particularly significant: "[Tihe fact that disparities in district
wealth result in disparities in tax effort required to reach foundation levels is
not by itself determinative of the issue before us. It is only insofar as such
disparities have the effect of producing disparities in educationalopportunity that they here concern us.' 8This suggests that the court is primarily concerned with ex post wealth neutrality and that the ex ante test interests the
court only because it believes that test will lead to ex post neutrality.
B. Additional Wealth-Related Ambiguities
Three additional ambiguities in Serranoff are: taxpayer equity requirements, the $100 rule of the trial court, and the constitutionality of basic
aid. 39 The court's taxpayer equity requirements would be dropped entirely if
the ex ante standard were rejected in favor of the expost standard. Tax rates
and expenditures return as fiscal policy tools to achieve wealth neutrality,
but do not define it. If the ex ante standard is maintained, then it is
important to distinguish between tax effort and tax rate because the latter is a
very particular concept of tax effort. 40 For example, most people consider a
35. Id. at 20. The convergence the court refers to is when all districts under S.B. 90 and
A.B. 1267, assuming no voter overrides, spend at the foundation level.
36. See text accompanying notes 20-22 supra.
37. Serrano II, 18 Cal. 3d. at 747, 557 P.2d at 939, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 355. The passage goes
on to assert that equal expenditure levels are not required, but that the current system gives
substantial advantages to high-wealth districts. Id.
38. Id. at 757 n.35, 557 P.2d at 945 n.35, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 361 n.35.
39. See notes 6, 7 & 8 supra.
40. See the discussion in text accompanying notes 34-38 supra.
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progressive income tax more equitable than a proportional income tax. As a
standard of constitutionality, it would indeed be unfortunate to require
"equal rates" rather than "equal efforts." Since the court in Serrano H
seems to view the tax requirements as a guide to neutrality rather than
neutrality itself, 4 1 the distinction becomes less important.
Because of the ex ante and expost distinction, the interpretation of the
trial court's $100 ruling is ambiguous. The court stated:
The following are each, in the context in which they are now
utilized, objectionable . . . from an equal-protection-of-the-laws
standpoint: . . . (3) wealth-related disparities in expenditures per
pupil among school districts, apart from the categorical aid, special-needs programs that do not reduce to insignificant differences,
which mean amounts considerably less than $100.00 per pupil,
within a maximum period of six years .... 42
The ex post interpretation of this ruling is that the average expenditure per
pupil within any given wealth class be within $100 of the average expenditure for any other wealth class. The ex ante interpretation is that if districts
make the same tax effort, they must receive support per pupil within $100 of
each other. These are very different requirements, but one can only speculate about the court's intention. The argument could be made that because
the court gave its approval to district power equalizing as a wealth neutral
system, 43 it must have had the ex ante definition in mind. But the state
schedule for district power equalizing does not have to allow wide choice of
expenditure level. The court's intention might have been to restrict local
choice within a $100 range in order to ensure that no gross expenditure
disparities would result.
One final matter is the constitutionality of basic aid. The court has
ruled it unconstitutional in the present system. 4 An unfortunate choice of
wording may have led to some confusion, however. 45 It is the inclusion of
basic aid in the equalization aid calculation that is anti-equalizing; this is
the only defect of basic aid in the current system. 46 Otherwise, basic aid is
simply a uniform grant per pupil funded out of state revenues. In fact, full
state funding, which the court stamped as wealth-neutral, 4 7 may be viewed
as a simple expansion of the basic aid concept.
41. See Serrano II, 18 Cal. 3d at 757 n.35, 557 P.2d at 945 n.35, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 361 n.35.
42. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 57, Serrano v. Priest, Super. Ct. of the

County of Los Angeles, No. 938,254 (Aug. 30, 1974).
43. Id. at 32.
44. Id. at 57, 62-63.
45. A.B. 65 eliminates basic aid entirely. While this could be quite intentional, to allow the
state to target its funds on low-wealth districts, it is not the only way to eliminate the defect.
Another way is simply to remove basic aid from the equalization aid calculation.
46. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 17, Serrano v. Priest, Super. Ct. of the
County of Los Angeles, No. 938, 254 (Aug. 30, 1974). See note 50 and accompanying text infra.
47. Id. at 31.
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I.

The Proposed Remedies

A. The Similarities Between A.B. 65 and S.B. 525

Two school financing proposals are presently before the legislature.
Governor Brown has introduced a plan, A.B. 65, through Assemblyman
Leroy Greene. Senator Albert Rodda, chairman of the Senate Finance
Committee, has introduced a competing plan, S.B. 525. The two bills are
more striking in their similarities than in their differences. 48 Both maintain
the current districts and allow local choice; hence, neither can satisfy both
concepts of wealth neutrality. Both retain the basic foundation plan with a
revenue limit, or district expenditure ceiling, for each district set by the
historical expenditure pattern of that district and adjusted annually for
inflation. Both retain the provisions allowing voter overrides of the revenue
limits. Certainly, to this point, both will surely offend the court. However,
both make substantial efforts to narrow the expenditure gap as well as the
differences in property tax rates. For example, both bills provide for increases in the foundation level of $400-$600 by fiscal year 1980-81.49 They
also propose to eliminate "slippage," the phenomenon whereby the assessed value of property grows faster than the foundation level, 50 resulting
in the decline of state equalization aid as a part of foundation level spending.
Both propose to eliminate slippage by holding the state share constant
through adjustment of the computational tax rate. 51 Further, both propose
48. The bills introduced to the legislature are subject to amendment at any time, and the
information available at the time of this writing may already be out of date. Information on
Governor Brown's plan consists of: A.B. 65 Cal. Legis., 1977-78 Reg. Sess. (Dec. 15, 1976)
(amended in Assembly Mar. 9, 1977) introduced by Assemblyman Greene; Education Committee, New State School Program as Proposed to be Amended into A.B. 65 (Feb. 24, 1977)
(memorandum); Education Systems Unit, Department of Finance, A.B. 65 (Greene), A New
State School Program for K-12 Local Assistance-A Five Year Implementation Plan (Feb.
1977) (mimeo) [hereinafter cited as Greene]. Information on Senator Rodda's proposal consists
of: S.B. 525, Cal. Legis., 1977-78 Reg. Sess. (Mar. 10, 1977) (introduced by Senators Rodda and
Dills); A. Rodda, Basic Elements of School Finance Proposal for Reasonable Compliance With
Serrano (Feb. 17, 1977) (memorandum) [hereinafter cited as Rodda]. Both A.B. 65 and S.B. 525
involve major adjustments to existing complex formulas, and without the benefit of computer
simulation, only rough calculations and rough approximations are available to make even
rougher estimates of the changes each bill makes from the status quo. Given these limitations, it
is best to make only broad observations.
49. The foundation level for 1976-77 was $1094 for unified districts. Greene, supra note
48, at 27. Under A.B. 65, this will be $1661 in 1980-81. Under S.B. 525, the level will be between
$1516 and $1544, depending upon inflation.
50. The state currently grants equalization aid to districts whose own assessed value/ADA
times a state computational tax rate is less than the difference between the foundation level and
basic aid. The equalization aid is the amount that would bring the district exactly to the
foundation level if it taxed itself at the computational rate. Algebraically: Equalization
aid = Foundation Level - [Basic Aid + (Computational Tax Rate x AV/ADA)]
51. A.B. 65 maintains the state share at the 1977-78 level; S.B. 525 maintains the state
share at the level of the prior year.
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that voter overrides be done on a power-equalized basis.5 2 In this respect,
A.B. 65 is less restrictive in that it applies this requirement to all voter
overrides above the foundation level after 1981-82; S.B. 525 only applies
power equalization to overrides above 120 percent of the foundation level
(after 1980-81). Finally, both propose to put an effective freeze on the tax
rates of the wealthiest districts and have the state recapture most of the
excess revenue generated above the revenue limit due to a growth in
assessed valuation. A.B. 65 allows the district to reduce tax rates by ten
percent of the reduction it could make to keep expenditures constant, and the
state recaptures the other ninety percent. S.B. 525 completely freezes the
tax rate, but the state only recaptures fifty percent of the excess above the
revenue limit.
A.B. 65 has three additional features aimed at Serrano conformance:
the elimination of basic aid, the imposition of minimum tax rates, and a
guaranteed yield program. 53 The removal of basic aid only affects districts
whose assessed value per ADA times the computational tax rate is higher
than the foundation level (i.e., high-wealth districts); all other districts will
have equalization aid increased by the decrease in basic aid. 54 The minimum
tax rate applies only to a few very high-wealth districts; when levied, the
state recaptures the excess revenue above the revenue limits. The guaranteed
yield program applies only to equalization aid districts and only to spending
above the foundation level but below the revenue limit. All spending above
revenue limits requires voter override and is power-equalized by the provision discussed above. Within this limited range, all districts must use the
same incremental tax rate to raise expenditure/ADA above foundation
levels. This tax rate is designed to be low, so that state aid is provided to
supplement the local funds in the vast majority of districts.
There is one provision of A.B. 65 which has an anti-equalizing effect.
Current legislation puts a "squeeze" on the revenue limits of all districts
with revenue limits above the foundation level. Each year there is a fixed
dollar inflation adjustment to all such limits, but only districts spending at
the foundation level receive the full adjustment, i.e., have a "squeeze
52. Under both plans, the addition necessary to the tax rate to raise a given amount of
additional expenditure is determined by dividing the additional expenditure/ADA by the state
average assessed value/ADA.
53. In addition to all the provisions mentioned so far, A.B. 65 provides substantial
categorical funding for the special needs of students, the high costs that some districts face, and
educational reform. In terms of education in general, these may be the most important components of the proposed bill. Discussion of them is omitted here because the details have no direct
bearing on Serrano compliance; these proposals are relevant only to the extent that they result
in the shifting of the financing burden from the local property tax. Since the total effect of A.B.
65 is to shift the state share from its current 40% to 43% in 1981-82, this will not be decisive. See
Greene, supra note 48, at 1-2.
54. See formula in note 50 supra.
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factor" of 1.0. Districts spending at twice the foundation level or more have
a "squeeze factor" of .5 and only receive half the inflation adjustment.
Between these two spending levels, the squeeze factor is computed proportionally: the closer spending is to the foundation level, the larger the allowed
adjustment to the revenue limit. Eventually, this would cause convergence
of the revenue limits of all districts. A.B. 65 modifies the squeeze factor to
1.0, the full amount, for all district spending at or below 120 percent of the
foundation level. This has the effect of ensuring that districts "squeezed" to
within 120 percent of the foundation level will not be squeezed further, thus
preventing convergence. High-wealth districts will be able permanently to
maintain revenue limits twenty percent higher than foundation level districts.
To recapitulate, A.B. 65 and S.B. 525 are remarkably similar. They
retain the framework of the current foundation system, but have a number of
provisions to reduce the expenditure gap and the variations in tax rates
necessary to produce given revenues. But the question remains: Do they go
far enough to satisfy either of the two tests for wealth neutrality?
B. Failure Under the Wealth Neutrality Tests
It may reasonably be argued that A.B. 65 and S.B. 525 are each
insufficient under both the ex ante and the expost tests. It seems clear that
equal tax efforts do not lead to equal revenues. High-wealth districts can
continue to spend at high levels with low tax rates. While the squeeze factor
may control expenditures, there is no mechanism to force tax efforts up to
the computational tax rate. The slippage provisions only prevent a worsening of the already defective status quo. The power equalizing provisions
may be a bit misleading; they are only incrementally power equalizing. The
high-wealth districts start with revenue limits much greater and tax rates
much lower than those of low-wealth districts. Even if both can add on with
"equal power," that still results in unequal total tax efforts and expenditures. Thus, neither bill satisfies the ex ante test for wealth neutrality.
The increase in foundation levels will put a substantial dent in the
expenditure gap; Beverly Hills may only be spending 160 percent of what
Baldwin Park spends. 55 According to the Rodda memorandum, ninety
percent of all of the state's ADA will be within a $200 expenditure range by
1980.56 If this is true, then the Governor's proposal may do even better. 57
Nevertheless, because of the perpetuation of historical patterns through
55.
56.
57.
proposal

See Greene, supra note 48, at 25 (table 8).
See Rodda, supra note 48, at 3.
Provided that the anti-equalizing squeeze modification is dropped, the governor's
seems to do more for Serrano compliance than does that of Senator Rodda. Neverthe-

less, the provisions of each are quite complex and this conclusion is at present tenuous.
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revenue limits, probably neither bill will satisfy the ex post test. It is
difficult for low-spending districts to catch up to high-spending districts
because voter overrides are necessary to close the gap. If districts are not
squeezed below 120 percent of the foundation level, this will create a
permanent hurdle that low-spending districts must overcome (i.e., override) while high-spending districts bypass it.
It is worth trying to understand why the legislature seems unwilling to
assume the task of compliance with Serrano other than by making incremental adjustments to the status quo. As both A.B. 65 and S.B. 525 attest,
the legislature has moved in the right direction but not far enough to require
major cutbacks in any school's program. There is an understandable fear
that such cutbacks would result in a flight from public to private schools.
The legislature is inclined to elevate the bottom half, but only to the extent
that it does not require a tax increase. The proposals go as far as they do
primarily because school enrollments are declining. That is, because the
number of school age children is decreasing, the total burden is easing. A
given amount of state aid is spread over fewer children, thereby increasing
expenditures per child. Furthermore, taxpayers in wealthier districts are
accustomed to paying a certain total; as their enrollments decline, excess
revenues are generated if expenditures per child are fixed at a ceiling. Thus,
the state can siphon off the excess revenues through the tax freeze provisions
mentioned above. Those revenues can then be used to increase foundation
levels and hence spending in low-wealth districts, and the taxpayer will feel
no more burdened as a result.
Such a strategy may, however, gain little. There are times when
principles deserve a stronger voice than they usually get in the political
process. It is a rare occasion when the highest court in a state places the
legislature so clearly on notice that the method of financing education is
wrong. Full compliance with the Serrano mandate is therefore inevitable.
Of course, the ambiguity of the ex ante and ex post standards may understandably lead to a certain amount of legislative confusion as to the court's
mandate. It is indeed unfortunate that although the legislature has taken
steps in the right direction, it does not have the will to achieve more
complete reform of California's school financing system.

Conclusion
An important ambiguity, the difference between ex ante and ex post
wealth neutrality, was not noticed by the courts in any of the Serrano
rulings. The former is a statement about rules, that equal tax efforts should
lead to equal expenditures. The latter is a statement about results, that
expenditures should not be correlated with the wealth of districts. While
there is no doubt as to the direction in which the legislature must move, the
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meaning of full compliance is ambiguous because it depends upon which
type of wealth neutrality is required.
If the court insists on the achievement of both ex ante and ex post
neutrality, then the only acceptable alternatives are redistricting into equal
wealth districts or full state funding. In systems with districts of varying
wealth that allow local choice, only one of the two standards can be met.
The ex post standard is preferable to the ex ante because the former is
concerned with the interests of children while the latter is not. The ex ante
concept can perhaps be interpreted as a guide to the achievement of ex post
neutral results. In its most recent ruling, the court seems to favor this
interpretation.58 If the court chooses the ex ante standard as an independent
concept, then it is important that the taxpayer equity requirement be stated in
terms of tax effort, not tax rate; otherwise the legislature may be forbidding
progressive taxation in school finance.
The two bills introduced into the legislature at the time of this writing,
A.B. 65 and S.B. 525, are remarkably similar in their gradual approach to
Serrano compliance and neither one is likely to satisfy either the ex ante or
the ex post standard because they probably cling too closely to historical
patterns already known to be defective. However, the legislature can comp59
ly with Serrano in many ways under either concept of wealth neutrality.
For legislators, such change is neither pleasant nor easy; nor will it be
desired by high-wealth, high-spending districts with few special pupil
needs. But for all of us, Serrano provides a unique opportunity to make
equal educational opportunity a reality.
58. Serrano II, 18 Cal. 3d at 757 n.35, 557 P.2d at 945 n.35, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 361 n.35. This

may be the second important Serrano footnote. See note 6 supra.
59. See California School Finance Task Force of the Graduate School of Public Policy,

University of California, Berkeley, Implementing the Serrano Decision: Constraints, Alternatives, and Avoiding Unintended Consequences (Aug. 1976) (summary report) (L. Friedman,
director). See also Sugarman, Principled Serrano Reform, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 511

(1977).

